- Türkiye’s recent mediation efforts suggest that its role as a reliable mediator in Africa will continue to grow, while its policy of non-intervention in African conflicts reinforces its neutrality
The author is a Professor Doctor at the Social Sciences University of Ankara.
ISTANBUL
Following the launch of the Mediation for Peace Initiative (MPI) [1] in 2010, together with Finland, Türkiye engaged in several mediation efforts across various regions and continents. The most prominent of these efforts has been Türkiye’s mediation between Russia and Ukraine, which culminated in the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022, also known as Grain Corridor. This initiative facilitated the safe export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea during the ongoing war.
Türkiye has also mediated or offered to mediate in various African contexts over the past decade.
Negotiating peace: From Ankara to Africa
Between 2013 and 2014, Türkiye hosted three rounds of talks between Somalia and Somaliland. The first round resulted in the Ankara Communique [2], while the last round [3] aimed to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. Although various international mediation efforts have been tried in order to address the differences between Somalia and Somaliland, a workable solution to their disputes remains as elusive as ever.
In 2021, Türkiye offered to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia [4]. For years, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been a source of friction between the two countries, with Egypt perceiving it as a direct threat to its water security while Ethiopia insists on its sovereign right to harness the river’s resources to meet its increasingly rising energy needs. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visits to both countries in the summer of 2024 suggest that the mediation process is still ongoing.
That same year, Türkiye offered to mediate in order to end the conflict in the Tigray region [5] of Ethiopia. Between 2020 and 2022, Ethiopia was engulfed in a civil war with militants from its northern Tigray region. In late 2022, a peace agreement [6] was reached between the Ethiopian government and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
It was again in 2021 that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Ankara is ready to contribute toward a peaceful solution between Ethiopia and Sudan [7] in an effort to resolve their border dispute over the Al-Fashaga region. The Al-Fashaga region is a disputed area between the two neighboring countries. Sudanese officials confirmed that they welcomed Türkiye’s mediation offer. Ethiopian authorities also expressed their appreciation for Türkiye’s role in the conflict resolution process. Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts, the parties could not agree on a mutually acceptable agreement.
Türkiye mediated three rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Somali and Ethiopian Foreign Ministers met in early July 2024 in Türkiye and signed the Joint Ankara Statement [8]. While the second round ended on Aug. 12 with no deal, the parties met on Dec. 11, 2024, for the third and final round. President Erdogan hosted the presidents of Somalia and Ethiopia and this last round of negotiations resulted in the Ankara Declaration [9]. Ethiopia secured access to and from the sea, while respecting the territorial integrity of Somalia. The parties met once again in February 2024 to discuss the technicalities [10] of the Ankara Declaration.
Why such an emphasis on mediation?
Mediation has become a core tenet of Türkiye’s foreign policy in recent years. But why is that the case? The mediation initiatives in different contexts solidify Türkiye’s role as a key actor in regional and global affairs. Following the launch of the MPI, Türkiye and Finland established the Group of Friends of Mediation within the UN framework. Turkish and Finnish-led MPI attracted huge international attention, as reflected in the growing number of member states. This highlights the recognition [11] of the critical role mediation plays in conflict prevention.
Expanding its footprint in Africa through a combination of soft and hard power instruments, Türkiye aims to play a constructive role in mediating Africa’s conflicts. This way, Türkiye does not only position itself as a crucial mediator in regional disputes, but it also strengthens its influence and strategic partnership across the continent. In doing so, Türkiye leverages its growing diplomatic ties with African countries along with its increasing capabilities as well as experience in conflict resolution across different crisis zones.
Why need third-party involvement?
Conflicts vary in complexity, with some presenting more intricate challenges than others. In many cases, it is more challenging for the conflicting parties to start negotiations and agree on the terms needed to resolve their disputes. This is especially true when conflicts are fueled by deep-seated historical mistrust between the belligerents.
Third-party mediators – whether international/regional organizations or individual states – can provide an unbiased platform for negotiations. Acting as neutral facilitators with knowledge and expertise in negotiation skills, they can foster dialogue, provide a secure space for discussions and even exert pressure on the parties to address their differences. In some cases, the involvement of third parties can help provide legitimacy to those efforts. They can ensure that all parties, including the weakest ones, are included and have an equal say in negotiations.
Having mediated in various African contexts, Türkiye’s mediation offers were often welcomed by the conflicting parties, or Türkiye mediated talks upon the request of regional actors. For example, it is reported [12] that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Special Representative Mulatu Teshome Wirtu, and Foreign Minister Taye Atske Selassie presented a formal letter from Abiy requesting Türkiye’s mediation to President Erdogan, during their meeting in May 2024, in Ankara. Türkiye’s recent mediation efforts suggest that its role as a reliable mediator in Africa will continue to grow, while its policy of non-intervention in African conflicts reinforces its neutrality.
[1] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa
[2] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ankara-communique-_-between-somali-and-somaliland_-13-april-2013.en.mfa
[3] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-22_-20-january-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-third-round-of-negotiations-between-somalia-and-somaliland.en.mfa
[4] https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkey-can-mediate-in-the-renaissance-dam-dispute
[5] https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2021/08/18/Turkish-President-Erdogan-offers-to-mediate-end-to-Ethiopia-fighting-
[6] https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130137
[7] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/sudan-accepts-turkeys-offer-to-mediate-disputes-with-ethiopia
[8] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-ankara-statement-(by-turkiye--ethiopia-and-somalia).en.mfa
[9] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa
[10] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkiye-hosts-1st-round-of-technical-talks-between-ethiopia-somalia/3486143
[11] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conflicts-and-mediation.en.mfa
[12] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cpw8xl54vj4o
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
